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CITATIONS TO TRANSCRIPTS
There are two transcripts in this matter:

a transcript of

the evidentiary hearing held on March 21, 1987 and a transcript
of the closing arguments on April 9, 1987, The transcript of the
evidentiary hearing will be referred to as "March Tr." and the
transcript of the closing argument will be referred to as "April
Tr.".

Pages and line numbers will be designated by decimals (.)

so that a reference to page 3, line 11, will appear as 3.11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 2, 1987, the lower Court issued an Order to Show
Cause requiring Defendant to appear before the Court on March 24,
1987, to show cause why certain orders should not be entered with
respect to visitation and the interpretation of provisions of the
1

Decree of Divorce relating to child support. (R. 303).
The basis of the Order to Show Cause was an affidavit
submitted by Defendant (R. 244) wherein Defendant stated, among
other things, that:
(a)

Plaintiff had refused to allow him visitation with the

minor children by constantly claiming unavailability of the
children by reason of prior plans made by Plaintiff;
(b)

Plaintiff had falsely claimed arrearages in child

support payments and had sought and obtained assistance from the
Office of Recovery
procedures.

Services who had

initiated

enforcement

At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Defendant

proffered evidence in support of these claims (March Tr. 4.17;
10.3; 10.15; 10.24 & 11.6).
The Order to Show Cause further claimed interference in the
sale of the family home.

However, those issues are now moot

insofar as this appeal is concerned.
The basis of the dispute with respect to child support
arrearages was that Plaintiff interpreted paragraphs 7 and 8 of
the Divorce Decree to provide that in the event of Plaintiff's
remarriage, Defendant was obligated

to continue making the

mortgage payments on the family and also to simultaneously
increase child support in a sum equal to two-thirds of the
mortgage payment.
unilaterally

Under Plaintiff's interpretation, which was

conceived

and not submitted

to the Court

for

approval, Defendant would have been seriously in arrears in child
support payments in a sum equal to one-third of the monthly
2

mortgage payment since Plaintiff's remarriage in August, 1984.
With respect to the child support issue, Defendant contended
that paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree provided that in the event
of Plaintiff's remarriage, Defendant's obligation to make the
house payment would cease with a simultaneous increase in his
obligation to pay child support in a sum equal to two-thirds of
the house payment.
At the hearing on March 24, 1987, both parties stipulated
that the relevant facts could be proffered and if there appeared
to be a dispute in the facts, either party could call witnesses
to testify (March Tr. 3.13 to 3.20).

The proffers were received

by the Court and both of the parties testified concerning facts
relating to visitation.
At the hearing on March 24, 1987, each party had full
opportunity to present evidence.

However, Plaintiff requested

leave to file a memorandum and such leave was granted. (March Tr.
19.10).

On or about April 2, 1987, nine (9) days after the

evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit rather than
a memorandum

(R. 311).

Defendant objected to the untimely

proffer of additional facts inasmuch as the hearing had been
concluded and Defendant was unable to file a opposing affidavit
(April Tr. 7.18).

The Court made a decision on the meaning of

paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree without ruling on the objection
(April Tr. 20.15 to 21.2).
On April 21, 1987, the Court entered its Order in the matter
(hereinafter "Subject Order").

A copy of the Subject Order is
3

attached as Exhibit A.
On April 20, 1987, Plaintiff filed an "Objection to Order,
Request for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial (R. 383)
(hereinafter "Objection, Request and Motion").

More than three

and one-half months later, on August 14, 1987, Plaintiff filed a
memorandum in support of the Objection, Request and Motion (R.
426).

A corrected memorandum was submitted on August 17, 1987

(R. 442). Hearing on the Objection, Request and Motion was held
on August 31, 1987.

The lower court denied the Objection,

Request and Motion on September 11, 1987 (R. 479).
At the outset, it is important to note, that very few of the
issues presented to this Court on appeal were ever mentioned or
presented to the trial court.

For example, the claim that

Findings and Conclusions should have been entered by the trial
court was never mentioned at the evidentiary hearing on March 24,
1987, at the closing argument on April 9, 1987, in the memorandum
in support of the Objection, Request and Motion or at the hearing
on the Objection, Request and Motion on August 31, 1987.
On November 10, 1987, Plaintiff appealed the Orders of April
21, 1987 and November 10, 1987 to this Court.
I.
THE TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE SUBJECT ORDER REGARDING
VISITATION AND INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE
DECREE WERE PROPERLY ENTERED
Under

Point

I of

her

brief,

Plaintiff

asserts

that

paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Subject Order was improperly entered
4

because:

(a) Said paragraphs constituted a modification of the

Decree in violation of Rule 9, Third District Court Rules of
Practice; and, (b)

the Court failed to enter Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law in support of paragraphs 1 and 4 of the
Subject Order.
A.

Compliance with Rule 9
The Subject Order was the result of a hearing on an Order to

Show Cause entered by the Court on March 2, 1987.

At that time,

the present version of Rule 9 upon which Plaintiff relies was not
in effect.

Thus, there was no necessity for filing a petition

for modification.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the

Subject Order constitutes a modification of the Decree with
respect to visitation, the Order to Show Cause properly brought
the issue before the trial court.
The current version of Rule 9, discussed by Plaintiff in her
brief, was not in effect until June 1, 1987.

Thus, on the date

that the Order to Show Cause was issued, and on the date of the
hearing on the Order to Show Cause, a modification did not need
to comply with the current version of Rule 9 as cited by
Plaintiff in her brief.
It is difficult to conceive of how paragraph 1 of the
Subject Order could be construed as a "modification" of the
Decree.

The Court made a decision to resolve a problem with

visitation by establishing a detailed visitation schedule to
avoid

"prior plans" claimed

by Plaintiff.

Moreover, the

structured visitation schedule is well within the scope of
5

"reasonable visitation".

Paragraph 1 of the Subject Order is

a

clarification of an existing Decree rather than a "modification"
of the Decree.
unnecessary.

Thus, a finding of changed circumstances was
Moreover,

the interference

with

Defendant's

visitation, which has occurred since the date of the Decree, is a
material change if such a change is necessary.
Paragraph
paragraphs

4 of

7 and

the

Subject

Order, which

interprets

8 of the Decree, cannot be considered

a

"modification".

The Court merely resolved

interpretations.

The wording of paragraph 7 of the Decree was

not changed

or modified,

it was clarified

the conflicting

and

construed.

Paragraph 7 and 8 of the Decree have the same meaning after
issuance of the Subject Order as they did prior to the issuance
of the Subject Order.

The Court merely rejected Plaintiff's

interpretation of those paragraphs.
B.

Findings of Fact
Plaintiff argues that paragraph 1 of the Subject Order

should be reversed because the lower court did not enter Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
All of Plaintiff's claims that the trial court should have
entered Findings and/or Conclusions on various issues have been
waived by Plaintiff inasmuch as such claims were never mentioned
or argued to the trial court.

It is well established that a

party may not raise issues on appeal that were not presented in
the lower court.

Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986);

English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Lane vs. Messer,
6

732 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company,
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).
The entry of Findings
paragraph

and Conclusions

in support of

1 of the Subject Order is unnecessary.

Anyone

reviewing the transcript can easily determine the basis of the
Court's decision.

Defendant

asserted

that Plaintiff

was

unjustifiably denying visitation by claiming that she had made
prior plans.

The obvious solution was to impose a detailed

visitation schedule so that Plaintiff would have advance notice
of visitation and thereby cease making prior inconsistent plans.
The decisions of the Supreme Court hold that there is a
presumption that the trial court considered all relevant evidence
when rendering a decision. Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah
1986); Walker vs. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985).

A party

claiming error by failure of the trial court to enter Findings
and Conclusions has the burden of rebutting this presumption.
Ibid.

Plaintiff has completely failed to rebut this presumption.

The case law further holds that if the evidence submitted to
the Court supports the Court's decision, Findings and Conclusions
are not required.
supra.

Paffel vs. Paffel, supra; Walker vs. Walker,

It is clear that the evidence presented to the trial

court supported the decision reflected in paragraph 1 of the
Subject Order.
The entry of Findings of Fact are unnecessary with respect
to paragraph 4 of the Subject Order inasmuch as no factual
determination was involved.

Construction of ambiguous wording is
7

a matter of law.

Even if it be assumed, for the sake of

argument, that paragraph 4 of the Subject Order involved a
determination of fact, the principles noted in the Paffel and
Walker establish that findings are unnecessary.
A Conclusion of Law in support of paragraph 4 of the Subject
Order is unnecessary inasmuch as the Court's decision is readily
apparent from the Order itself.

The only possible Conclusion of

Law would be a verbatim quotation of the Order.
Assuming

for the sake of argument

that

Findings

and

Conclusions should have been entered, the remedy is not reversal
of the Subject Order.

The proper remedy would be to remand the

case to the lower court with instructions to enter Findings and
Conclusions.
Plaintiff

In order to obtain a reversal of the order,

has

the

burden

of

proving

that

there

was

a

misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law that resulted in
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly
preponderated

against the decisions of the Court or that a

serious inequity resulted so as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.

English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).

Mere

failure to enter Findings or Conclusions does not make the order
invalid.
II.
THE SUBJECT ORDER ACCURATELY STATES THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE COURT'S RULING
Plaintiff asserts that paragraphs 1(b), (d), (e), (f), (g)
and (h) do not accurately reflect the substance of the Court's
8

oral decision in the matter.
In this regard, paragraph 1(b) is supported by the record.
(April

Tr. 6.22).

Paragraphs

1(a), (c), (e) and

supported by the record (March Tr. 27.1).

(g) are

Although paragraph

1(g) is admittedly different than the Court's oral decision,
paragraph 1(g) specifies less visitation than the Court ordered
so that Plaintiff has no cause to complain.
The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint relates to visitation
of the father on Father's Day (paragraph 1(d)), visitation for
two (2) hours on Christmas Day in even numbered years (paragraph
1(f)) and visitation for two (2) hours on the child's birthday
(paragraph 1(h)).
It is important

to note that at the time the closing

arguments were presented to the Court on April 9, 1987, a draft
of the Subject Order containing the detailed visitation schedule
was in the hands of Plaintiff's attorney
17.5).

(April Tr. 11.15 &

The draft contained the exact language of the final Order

except as to additional items discussed at the hearing (April Tr.
21.3 & 17.9).
During that hearing, Plaintiff's attorney noted all of the
problems with respect to the proposed Order (April Tr. 17). The
items of which Plaintiff now complains were not mentioned (April
Tr. 17-18).

Thus, Plaintiff has waived the objections.

Paffel

vs. Paffel, supra; English vs. English, supra; Lane vs. Messer,
supra; Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company, supra.
Even if the objections had not been waived, the items of
9

which Plaintiff complains are fair and reasonable.

Moreover, it

must be presumed, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that
Judge Young read the Subject Order at the time it was signed and
approved of the items of which Plaintiff now complains.

See

Paffel vs. Paffel, supra; Walker vs. Walker, supra.
With respect to the Christmas visitation (paragraph 1(f)),
Plaintiff's standing to complain is questionable.

The visitation

specified in the Order is much less than orally directed by the
Court (March Tr. 27).
III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEB
Plaintiff asserts that the award of attorneys fees should be
reversed

because there was no evidence that the fees were

reasonable.

This issue, like many other

issues raised by

Plaintiff in this appeal, is raised for the first time before
this Court.

During the course of the March evidentiary hearing,

Plaintiff made no suggestion of any issue of reasonableness of
fees.
The evidence on attorneys fees was submitted to the Court in
the form of an exhibit which was marked as Exhibit 7-D (March Tr.
10-12).

At that the conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff made no

objection with respect to the admission of Exhibit 7-D.

In this

regard, note the following quotation from page 32 of the March
Transcript:
"Judge Young:...Let me ask, before we go
formally into recess, we did not enter the
exhibits. Do you wish them to be
10

Mr. McDonald:
I would
evidence, your Honor.
Judge Young:
exhibits?

Any

offer

objection

them
to

into
those

Ms. Corporon:
I still haven't had an
opportunity to look at them, your Honor. I
assume they are summary exhibits of his
testimony. I don't have any objection, your
Honor.
Judge Young:

They will be received.

(Where upon, Defendant's Exhibits 1-8 were
offered and received into evidence.) (March
Tr. 32).
It should further be noted that the issue of reasonableness
of the fees is irrelevant inasmuch as only a fraction of the fees
were awarded.

Exhibit 7-D established fees incurred by Defendant

in the sum of $3,340.75.

The total award of attorneys fees was

only $500.00.
At no time during the hearing did Plaintiff question the
reasonableness of the attorneys fees noted in Exhibit 7-D.
IV.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8
OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff

contends

that the Court committed

error in

interpreting the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original
Decree.
Plaintiff's argument is based upon three totally unfounded
assumptions: (a)

the Court ignored the rules of construction

established in various Supreme Court cases;

(b)

the Court was

unable to ascertain the intent of the parties from the wording of
11

the Decree; (c)

the Court relied on extrinsic evidence to

determine the intent of the parties.
It is apparent that the Court closely followed the rules of
construction as set forth in Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981).

That rule of construction requires that

the Court first attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties
from the wording of the instrument.

It is only when the intent

cannot be determined from the wording of the instrument that the
Court turns to extrinsic evidence.
It makes no difference whether the Court determined the
intent of the parties from the wording of the Decree or from
evidence proffered by the parties.

In either event, the result

is the same.
A. Determination of Intent From Wording of Decree
The intent of the parties is apparent from an analysis of
the wording of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree.

The wording of

paragraphs 7 and 8 is as follows:
"7.
Plaintiff is awarded the real property
of the marriage in the form of a home located
at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, subject to a lien thereon for one-half
of the equity that may be in the house at the
time of liquidation (which contemplates an
increasing equity as the value increases).
The equity is defined as the fair market
value or sales price at the time Defendant
becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages,
costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and
costs of sale.
This lien shall not be
forecloseable until the youngest child
reaches 18, or until the home is sold or
until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence
of any of these events, two-thirds of the
house payments then made shall be converted
12

to child support an that sum shall be paid to
the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as
additional child support•
8, Defendant is ordered to continue making
the payments on the home.
Defendant shall
also be entitled to take the entire interest
portion of the house payment as a deduction
for himself as well as three (3) income tax
exemptions on the children with Plaintiff to
receive one exemption on the youngest child
at the present time." (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff remarried

in August, 1984 (March Tr. 15.10).

Thereafter, she and her new husband resided in the former marital
domicile for approximately one year (March Tr. 15.14) and then
arranged for tenants to occupy the home (March Tr. 15.19).
Plaintiff contends that paragraph 7 means that upon her
remarriage or sale of the family home, Defendants obligations
for support increase because Defendant must continue making
mortgage payments on the home where she and her new husband
resided (an impossibility if the home is sold) and Defendant must
also increase child support payments in an amount equal to twothirds of the mortgage payment.
Defendant contends that paragraph 7 means upon Plaintiff's
remarriage or upon sale of the home, his obligations decrease in
that he no longer is obligated to make the mortgage payment, but
pays a greater amount of child support in a sum equal to twothirds of the mortgage payment (adjusted for children reaching
the age of majority and children who thereafter reside with
Defendant).
An

analysis

of

the

wording

of

the

Decree

in

the

circumstances under which the underlying contract was negotiated,
13

clearly demonstrates that Defendant interpretation is correct*
The parties could not have intended the interpretation
asserted by Plaintiff.

Under Plaintiff's contention, when the

home is sold (an event in the same category as her remarriage),
Defendant must continue to make the mortgage payment.

Obviously,

such an interpretation cannot stand inasmuch as after a sale of
the home, there would be no mortgage payment.

Thus, it is

apparent that the parties intended that upon the occurrence of
any one of the events in paragraph

7 such as Plaintiff's

remarriage or the sale of the home, Defendant's obligation to
make the mortgage payment would cease and his child support
obligations would increase in an amount equal to two-thirds of
the mortgage payment previously made.
It is common knowledge that when a divorced woman remarries
she thereby obtains an additional source of support through the
earning capacity of her new husband.

Such an obvious fact was

apparent to parties at the time they negotiated the agreement
underlying the Decree.

In such a circumstance, it would be

logical to assume that any adjustment conditional upon remarriage
would result in a decrease of support rather than an increase.
At that

the time the parties negotiated

the contract

underlying the Decree, it would be ludicrous to assume that:
Defendant intended to provide a residence for Plaintiff's nev;
husband in the event of remarriage.

Thus, it is logical to

conclude that when a divorce decree dictates a change upon
remarriage of the wife, the parties did not intend that the
14

former husband would pay for the residence of the new husband.
In construing
logical meaning.

the Decree, words should be given their
In this regard, Defendant calls the Court's

attention to the word "converted".

According to Webster's New

Collegiate Dictionary, 1974 edition, the word "converted" means
"...to change from one form to another" and "...to exchange for
an equivalent".

On the basis of this definition, if two-thirds

of the house payment is "converted" to child support, there can
no longer be a house payment.
Any

logical

view

of

the

situation

would

demand

construction placed upon paragraphs 7 and 8 by the Court.

the
It is

apparent that the parties, in the face of Plaintiff's remarriage,
were making adjustments for the pre-marriage tax consequences.
If Plaintiff is making the mortgage payments, he is entitled to a
deduction for the portion attributable to interest.

At or about

the time that the underlying contract was negotiated, Plaintiff
was receiving a tax benefit equal to approximately one-third of
the mortgage payment.

It is apparent that the parties intended

the conversion from house payment to child support to equalize
the after tax impact on Defendant.
B. Determination of Intent from Extrinsic Evidence
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the
lower Court turned to extrinsic evidence to construe paragraphs 7
and 8 of the Decree, the Court was not bound to accept the selfserving statements of Plaintiff especially when such statements
are totally outside the realm of reason and contradicted by
15

Defendant's evidence.

Plaintiff contended that Defendant agreed

to continue to make the house payment so as to benefit from a
"real estate investment".

Obviously, no person would consent to

an "investment" whereby such person would pay the entire cost and
receive half of the value.
Defendant proffered evidence contrary to the evidence that
was untimely submitted by Plaintiff in her affidavit filed after
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.

Defendant proffered

that the negotiations leading up to the agreement upon which the
Decree was

based

centered

upon

the proposition

that upon

Plaintiff's

remarriage Defendant's overall obligation would

decrease in an amount equal to one-third of the house payment
(March Tr. 4.25);

that Defendant did not intend

to provide

support to Plaintiff's new husband (March Tr. 5.11); and, that
since Defendant had a substantial investment in the home, he
would continue to make the house payment as a credit against
child support (March Tr. 6.10).

Had it not been for the untimely

proffer evidence by Plaintiff, Defendant would have proffered
additional evidence of intent (See April Tr. 7-8).

However, the

evidence that was proffered by Defendant clearly supports the
decision of the lower court.
With respect to Plaintiff's claim of error in failing to
enter

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law, Defendant

incorporates by reference his arguments set forth in Section I of
this brief.

16

CONCLUSION
The majority of points raised by Plaintiff in her brief are
raised for the first time on appeal.

The few issues that were

submitted to the trial court were properly determined.

Plaintiff

has totally failed to demonstrate a basis for reversal on any
issue

raised

in

her

brief,

i.e.,

that

there

was

a

misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the decision was
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or that a
serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.

English vs. English, supra.

On these grounds,

Defendant submits that the Subject Order should be affirmed in
its entirety.
DATED this ^ ^

day of June, 1988.

MCDONALD & BULLEN:

Robert M. McDonald
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

<^^/> day of June, 1988, I

served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Respondentf s
Brief upon the following named

persons by depositing

said

document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Craig M, Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

H
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Robert M. McDonald, (#2175)
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
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CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff/

ORDER
Civil No. D-80-931

-vsCASS BETTINGER,
Defendant.

n «i w

^

oooOooo
The issues raised by the Order to Show Cause

heretofore

issued by the Court, was heard before the Honorable David Young,
District Judge, on Tuesday, March 24, 1987.

Present at said

hearing were Robert M. McDonald representing defendant and Mary
Corporon representing plaintiff.

The Court having heard

the

testimony and proffers submitted by the respective parties, and
having heard the arguments of counsel, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant shall have the right to visit the child born

of the marriage, Nicole, age 10, at the following times:
(a)

Every other weekend beginning on Friday

evening at 5:00 p.m. and ending Sunday evening at
6:00 p.m.;
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(b)

Visitation on one weekday for a period of

three hours during those weeks when there is no weekend
visitation and said visitation shall take place on
Wednesday of such week unless defendant designates
a different date on or before Sunday of said week;
(c)

Summer vacation visitation for a period of

six weeks during the

months of June, July and August of

each calendar year the dates to be designated by
defendant;
(d)

Visitation on every Father's Day for a period

of six hours designated by defendant;
(e)

During even numbered calendar years holiday

visitation for eight hours to be designated by
defendant on New Year's Day, Easter, Independence
Day, Labor Day and Thanksgiving and in odd numbered
calendar years on President's Day, Memorial Day,
Pioneer Day, Veterans Day and Christmas Day;
(f)

During odd numbered calendar years when

defendant does not have visitation for the entire
Christmas Day, defendant shall have visitation for a
period of two hours on Christmas Day;
(g)

Visitation for an entire day during the

child's Christmas holiday, the date to be designated by
defendant;
(h)

Visitation for two hours on the child's
2

birthday.
Defendant shall notify plaintiff on or before the Thursday prior
to weekend visitation if defendant will be unable to exercise
such weekend visitation,
2.

Plaintiff

shall

not

in any

m a n n e r , directly

or

indirectly, impair plaintiff from making telephone contact with
the minor child, Nicole.

Plaintiff shall use her best efforts to

facilitate and encourage telephone contact between defendant and
said child.
3.

Control of the former family home located at 2740 East

4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall forthwith be transferred
to defendant.

In this regard, plaintiff

shall

immediately

deliver to defendant keys to all locks in the home and keys to
all locks on appurtenant structures and a copy of the most recent
listing agreement.

Thereafter, defendant shall have full and

exclusive

authority

terminate

listing

supervise

and

to:

(a) negotiate, execute, amend, or

agreements with

control

any

respect

activity

to the home;

or arrangement

(b)

deemed

necessary by defendant to facilitate the sale of the home; (c)
negotiate, arrange or terminate any interim rental agreement with
respect to the home; (d) make any arrangement, improvement or
repair which defendant feels will facilitate sale of the home to
be paid

from the proceeds of sale of

the house.

Provided,

however, that the home shall not be sold except at a price and
upon terms acceptable to both parties.
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In the event the parties

cannot agree as to the selling price or terms of sale, the matter
shall be submitted to the Court.
4.

Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered

in this action

is construed

as follows:

upon

plaintiff's

remarriage, defendant is relieved from any further obligation to
make the monthly installment payments on the mortgage on the
family home, but defendant's obligation for child support shall
be increased in a sum equal to two-thirds of the monthly mortgage
payment*

By reason of defendant's equity in said home, defendant

shall have the option to make the monthly installment payment on
the family home and shall receive full credit against his child
support obligations.
5.

The judgment heretofore entered

by the Court on or

about March 24, 1986, in the principal sum of $2,705.50 is hereby
vacated and set aside.
6.

The Court finds that defendant is current with respect

to all obligations for child support up to and including March
31, 1987.
7.

Judgment

is hereby entered in favor of defendant and

against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 representing a portion of
the costs and attorney's fees incurred by defendant in obtaining
this Order.
8.

Inasmuch

orthodontic

bill,

as plaintiff
the dispute

resolved.
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has paid
relating

and discharged
thereto

has

the
been

DATED th is

$r

day of April, 1987.

Qtmk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
**pm*Ctark

I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1987, I

served a true and accurate copy of an Order upon plaintiff by
depositing said copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Mary C. Corporon
Attorney at Law
Corporon & Williams
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake CiJ-yV Ut>h
s
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